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DEFECTIVE FORECLOSURES OF REAL ESTATE
By JOHN E. GORSUCH, of the Denver Bar
OR the past few years I have been more or less a regular

F'

member of that group of money-changers who gather
on Tuesday mornings about 10:00 o'clock on the steps
of our six million dollar Temple of Justice and listen to our
Clerk and Recorder, who serves as Public Trustee without
hope of additional compensation (see Lail vs. Denver, 88
Colo. 362, 297 Pac. 512) reading at considerable lengthrather brief and extremely dry notices published in papers
which the eye of man seldom sees and never reads-wherein
and whereby somebody's dream of a little place all their own
suddenly fades and is no more-for it has been foreclosed.
As I have stood there watching some old couple creep
away after having heard some young bird like myself call out,
"I bid three thousand dollars on behalf of the Last Chance
Mortgage Company," I have often wished I could run down
the long flight of steps after them and whisper in their earsof course at the same time handing them my card-"I can
set that sale aside, for the mortgage company forgot to dot
the I in your name in the advertisement."
I will admit I
might be disbarred for soliciting business if I did it, but occasionally I am tempted to risk it.
On other occasions as I have waited my turn to bid I
have been impressed by the number of individuals who apparently are acting as their own counsel, conducting their
own foreclosures and depending entirely on their own knowledge to steer them through a proceeding in which the doctrine
of "caveat emptor" is applied universally by the courts. Our
own Court has announced this rule on several occasions. It
will suffice to mention the cases of Lewis vs. Hamilton, 26
Colo. 263, 58 Pac. 196; Bent-Otero Imp. Co. vs. Whitehead,
25 Colo. 354, 54 Pac. 1023, and Stratton vs. Murray, 25
Colo. App. 395, 138 Pac. 1015.
The result is that the purchaser may be obtaining little
or nothing, a faulty title is born, and praise be Allah, a lawyer must be employed.
Some years ago our office had a client who had considerable of this type of business who was in the habit of chiding
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us about how easily we earned our fee on foreclosures. One
day he went to the Court House, secured the necessary gratis
forms, and had his own little sale without saying anything
to us about it. Not long after the title came in for examination and we very quietly, gently, but firmly, pointed out no
less than seven errors in the proceedings, with the result that
we now advise at least one person on everything pertaining
to the realm of the law.
As it is quite impossible to cover the entire field of foreclosures this noon even if I were familiar with it, and as I
thought it would only be boring for me to try to read at
length from a multitude of authorities pro and con, I concluded that I would merely sketch a few situations which
might arise in any of our offices.
For this reason I have chosen to present this matter with
the aid of a few characters, and in so doing I have, for the
sake of clarity, referred to the borrower always as the mortgagor and the party loaning as the mortgagee, although the
instrument involved might be a deed of trust and not a mortgage.
First, we have the man who loans the money.
Mr. Mortimer Gage, called by his friends "Mort"
Gage.
Second, the chap who needs the money.
Ben Dunn.
Third, Gage's (the mortgagee's) lawyer.
M. I. Wise.
Fourth, Dunn's (the mortgagor's) lawyer.
R. E. Tainer.
These parts as well as the remaining members of the
cast, including hundreds of dancing girls, soldiers, sailors,
police and members of compliance boards, will be taken by
myself. The off-stage effects, including the sounds from the
discontented and restless mob, will be furnished by the audi-
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ence. All scenes take place in Colorado, and the time is in the
fourth year of the depression.
This touching episode is called "Don't put off until tomorrow what you can do today."
Our note signer has found himself once again familiar
with the term "hard money" and so he is not surprised when
he receives a little clipping from Uncle Sam notifying him to
be present at a sale on one of the properties which Gage, the
mortgagee, has requested the Public Trustee to hold on Tuesday, June 12th. If there is anything our friend Dunn, the
mortgagor, has learned from his counselor it is to be present
at the sale with a neutral witness or two and observe what
goes on, and so he appears-but alas, neither Gage nor his
lawyer are there, the Trustee is absent, and no sale is had.
Dunn gallops into Tainer's office, tells his story and departs
satisfied when the old lawyer tells him to forget it and he will
look into it. A few days later the certificate of sale is recorded, showing the sale had been had at the time and place
advertised.
"Something rotten in Denmark," mused Tainer, and
after a little nosing around he finds that the mortgagee's lawyer, Wise, had requested the Public Trustee to let the sale go
until he got back from a little fishing trip, but finding fishing
better than the law practice, he wired the Trustee to go ahead
and hold the sale at once, but to date it on the day advertised.
The Trustee then held the sale on Wednesday, the day following the date on which it was set, and bid it in for a deficiency.
When the fish stopped biting for Wise and he returned
to Denver he found that it had been he rather than the fish
that had been hooked, for on his desk he found a copy of
complaint, accompanied by a terse note from his client, stating that Dunn was seeking to set the sale aside.
Wise worried not, for he reasoned that nobody could
prove that the sale had not been properly held unless the
Trustee would admit his sworn statements were false, so the
trial came on. The truth came out-the Judge read the case
of Brown vs. Belles, 17 Colo. App. 529, 69 Pac. 275, and
immediately granted the relief prayed for in the complaint.
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As is the habit between counsel and client, they returned
to Tainer's office after the decision and relived their sweet
moments of victory, and if we were listening we might have
heard the counselor telling his client as follows: "Well, you
know, Dunn, this business of postponing sales is a mighty
dangerous one. For example, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina said in the case of Ferebee vs. Sawyer, 167 N. C.
199, 83 S.E. 17, L. R. A. 1915-B 640, 'Where a mortgage
foreclosure sale is postponed or adjourned, a new and sufficient notice of the time and place for the sale must be published.'
"The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held in the case
of Clark vs. Simons, 150 Mass. 357, 23 N. E. 108, that
when a mortgage sale was adjourned for want of bidders
from time to time, that the oral proclamation of the auctioneer was insufficient, and in an early Indiana case, Patten vs.
Stewart, 26 Ind. 395, an oral notice of a sale which was
adjourned by injunction was declared insufficient.
"As a matter of fact, as the Supreme Court of Virginia
pointed out in a recent decision, Dickerson vs. McNulty, 142
Va. 559, 129 S. E. 242, 'whether the postponement must
be for the same length of time as the original notice is a question upon which the authorities are in hopeless conflict.'
"Of course I don't know what our Court may decide,
but I am sure that they will insist that reasonable notice of
the postponement must be given and that probably such notice be published. A few states have gone so far as to insist
that notice of the postponed sale be published for as long a
period as was the original sale." See Griffin vs. Martin Co.,
52 Ill. 130, and Glenn vs. Wooten, 3 Md. Ch. 514.
This next scene is called "The Period of Redemption,"
but it does not take place in any pawnshop.
Our friend, Gage, has foreclosed a trust deed on Dunn's
home, dated before the 1929 act, lessening the redemption
period from nine to approximately six months, and about
seven months have gone by since the Public Trustee's sale.
He is extremely anxious to get possession, as the Court has
refused him a receivership, and so he strolls into Wise's office,
asking him if he can get him possession at once. The latter,
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excusing himself for a moment, rushes next door and looking
through his fellow barrister's Compiled Laws and Courtright
1932 Supplement, comes back and says he knows he can, as
the law says that the redemption period is six months, unless
there are junior incumbrancers and judgment creditors who
have signified their intention to redeem, and Gage assures him
there are none. Wise, in order to show his client his real
wisdom, then says, "Well, even if the old law applied,
Dunn's time to redeem was done in six months and only
judgment creditors then have any right to redeem. Sure, I'll
get you possession for about-" well, whatever it was, Gage
paid it.
Wise then serves the mortgagor, Dunn, with a notice
demanding possession, and so Dunn hies himself to his old
friend and counselor, R. E. Tainer, with his problem. The
latter, who knows enough not to know too much too soon,
says, "Well, he can't get you out without a Court order anyhow, so you come back the first of the week and we will see
if we can figure out some way to keep you in."
The next week Dunn comes in worried sick, as he has
been served with summons, but old Tainer says, "Don't
worry, they haven't a leg to stand on. In the first place, you
are not affected by the change in the redemption period, as
the law considers as a part of the mortgage contract the statutes then in existence affecting the right and method of redemption therefrom, even though the mortgage does not
recite the time allotted thereunder for redemption and does
not refer to the statute in any way. The Courts have held
so as recently as June, 1933, when the Supreme Court of
North Dakota in the case of State ex rel. Cleveringa vs. Klein,
249 N. W. 118, said, 'The law fixing the period of redemption from a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale, existing at
the time of the entering into a contract of mortgage * * *
is a part of the contract of the mortgage, and any change in
the law fixing the period of redemption-whether the law
shortens the period of redemption or extends the period of
redemption-is an impairment of the obligations of such
contract.' If this case doesn't satisfy him, we will have him
read Clark vs. Reyburn, 75 U. S. 354; Brine vs. Hartford
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Fire Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627, and Turk vs. Mayberry, 121
Pac. (Okla.) 665."
"Then again you don't need to worry, for being governed by the old law, our own Court has repeatedly held that
the mortgagor, which is you, Dunn, has two valuable rights
remaining after his time of six months for redeeming has
expired and those are, first, the right to possession, and second, the right to have his judgment creditors redeem. I'll
just call old Wise on the phone and ask him to read the cases
of Farmers Assn. vs. Bank, 86 Colo. 293, 281 Pac. 366, and
Lane vs. Morris, 77 Colo. 343, 237 Pac. 154.
"That ought to end it."
And so our friend, Dunn, lived happily in his house
three months longer before the big, bad Gage got it.
The third scene is entitled, "A laborer is worthy of his
hire, but a lawyer works for faith, hope and mostly charity."
"What about this business of attorney's fees?" Dunn
one day asked his lawyer. "You know, I have noticed that
Wise has been steadily raising the amount he charges as fees
for supervising the foreclosures he is bringing against me, so
that now they amount to a lot. As far as I can see, he has a
comparatively easy job of it and I doubt that Gage pays him
anything like the ten per cent or more that he is adding to the
amount due for his-services in connection with the sale."
"Maybe so," replied Tainer, "but that's a touchy subject to discuss with any lawyer, because if we say another
chap's services are not worth much, he can say the same about
ours. There are plenty of other folks who will say that lawyers' fees are too high without them admitting it-and the
Courts themselves are equally slow to set aside fees because
they know how difficult it is to place a value on a man's advice or to properly ascertain how much work may be involved in any case. One client demands but little, while
another with a similar case wants to monopolize his lawyer's
every waking moment.
"However these sales through the Public Trustee present a somewhat different situation than the ordinary case of
an allowance of attorney's fees. Usually fees are passed on
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by the Court and entered as a part of the decree, so that the
debtor has the protection of knowing that the Court has satisfied itself that the fees claimed are bona fide, just, and reasonable, and of presenting to the Court any arguments he
may have to have the fees set at an amount which he believes
to be fair.
"No such protection is offered to him by the Public
Trustee unless the latter is willing to embroil himself in arguments with the attorneys and the mortgagees.
"There are a few general rules, however, that the Courts
have made which throw some light on this situation.
"To begin with, our Supreme Court in several cases, towit: Florence Co. vs. Hiawatha Co., 55 Colo. 378, 135 Pac.
454; Jones vs. Bank, 74 Colo. 140, 219 Pac. 780; Legge vs.
Peterson, 85 Colo. 462, 277 Pac. 787, and Gertner vs. Bank,
82 Colo. 13, 257 Pac. 247, has laid down the doctrine 'That
as an attorney's fee in a note is to protect and indemnify the
holder and not to enrich him, he can recover only what he
has paid or obligated himself to pay, and such payment or
obligation must be actual, bona fide, and reasonable.'
"It would appear that even though you had agreed in
the note and trust deed to pay a certain amount if there was a
foreclosure that would not estop you from raising the question of fees. This was definitely established in this state by
the Jones vs. Bank case.
"There are a few cases in other jurisdictions which
show how far the Courts have gone to protect the debtor
from unjust claims. The Wyoming Court in the case of
Graves vs. Burch, 181 Pac. 354, refused to allow attorney's
fees even though they were provided for in the mortgage
where the mortgagor owing an overdue mortgage was lulled
into inaction by the mortgagee, who told him not to worry
about payment and then immediately assigned to a stranger,
who started suit without demand; the mortgagor's tender of
the amount due less attorney's fees was held sufficient.
"There is an interesting Michigan case found in 56 N.
W. 931, called Baxter's Estate vs. Wilkinson, in which the
Court held that where property was bid in by the mortgagee
for the full amount due, including illegal attorney's fees, that
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the amount of such fees should be treated as surplus and belonged to the owner of the equity of redemption; that as
there was no redemption made the owner had the right to
sue the mortgagee to recover such surplus at any time before
his right of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
"In Minnesota the Court held in the case of Truesdale
vs. Sidle, 67 N. W. 1004, that where the mortgagees foreclosed under a power of sale, including illegal attorney's fees,
they had no right in equity to have the sale set aside and a
new sale ordered but were liable to the mortgagor for the
attorney's fees charged.
"Of course I know the next question in your mind,
Dunn, and that is whether the chap whose house has been
sold by the Public Trustee has a right to have the sale set
aside if he can prove that illegal fees have been charged. That
question cannot be directly answered except to say that if the
Court construed it to be a fraud on his rights, then it would
undoubtedly set it aside on the theory advanced in the case of
Toll vs. McKenzie, et al., 88 Colo. 582, 299 Pac. 14, in
which the Court said that where a mortgagee has engineered
a constructive fraud in the sale, he can obtain no relief against
the purchaser by foreclosure or otherwise until the wrong he
perpetrated is undone, and those damaged made whole.
"If the Court would construe that by seeking illegal
fees, the mortgagee had foreclosed for an amount in excess of
that which was due, and if it followed the case of West vs.
Bates, 70 Colo. 355, 201 Pac. 562, it would cancel the certificate of sale and enjoin the issuance of the trustee's deed.
"At any rate, Dunn, I am convinced that if our Public
Trustee would demand receipts for the attorney's fees claimed
in the foreclosures before allowing them, they would go a
long way in insuring the bona fides of the fees claimed and
would stop lay persons from including fees to which they
were not entitled."
The fourth and last scene is called "If you don't at first
foreclose, sue, sue again."
"Say, Tainer," asked his client, "do you remember the
property that I sold a half interest in to my brother, in Canada, and on which Gage had a trust deed? Well, I just found
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out that the Public Trustee issued his deed on it the last week
although the redemption period is still not up. You know,
I never received any notice of it although I am still living at
the address given in the trust deed. My brother just wired
me enough money to redeem the property. What can we do
about it?"
"Sounds like we can do plenty," replied the old lawyer.
A few days later in popped Dunn again: "Say, you
know I made that tender to the Public Trustee of the redemption money like you told me to but he refused to take
it. Gage wouldn't take it either."
"Humph," growled his counselor, "guess the Trustee
has been reading the Carlson vs. Howes case. Here, you read
it for yourself, Dunn." And blowing the dust off of 69
Colo. he opened it at page 246 and handed it to his client.
"I don't understand this case, Mr. Tainer, because the
Public Trustee told me this morning that he was going to
issue another deed to Gage as soon as the redemption period
has expired, and although this case holds he could not issue
a redemption certificate to me, it also says he can't issue a second deed, as he has conveyed his interest in the property by
his first deed."
"Well, Dunn, I'd say you understand the case pretty
well for a fellow who is supposed to need my services to tell
him what the cases mean. Guess I won't give you any more
decisions to read or you will be scabbing on me by looking up
the law for yourself. From what you say it looks like the
Public Trustee and Gage are mighty friendly. Wonder what
the reason is?"
"I can't tell you all the law just yet," replied Dunn,
"But I can answer that one for you. Gage holds the mortgage on the Trustee's home and it falls due next month and
the latter has to get the old boy to refinance it."
"Looks to me like the Trustee never read that case or is
afraid to remember what it said," replied Tainer. "I'll tell
you what we had better do. I don't like to get the Trustee
involved in a lawsuit in which these facts would come out,
as it might cost him his job. I think I will try and get Wise
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to bring his client over and then the Trustee, you and I, will
meet with them and see what we can work out."
Tainer phoned Wise and turning to his client said,
"Well, Wise is willing to confer, but he says he is too busy
to come over here and if we want to talk we will have to go
to his office. Of course you know we all like to fight on our
own grounds."
The scene now shifts to Wise's office. The weather, the
depression, and the football results having been thoroughly
discussed, the conversation turns to the business in hand.
"Well," said Wise, "why can't the Trustee issue a new
deed? I'll admit I figured the period of redemption wrong."
Tainer then explained the Carlson case and also the
earlier decision of Stephens vs. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, on which
it was based.
Wise then grudgingly admitted:
"Guess you are right about that, but I'll just bring a
quiet title suit. You know a beneficiary under a trust deed
or the Trustee can do that in this state, don't you, Tainer?
I just looked that up. You read the case of Munson vs.
Marks, 52 Colo. 553, if you don't believe me."
"I believe you all right, Wise, but that is where he seeks
to have adverse claim of some third party adjudicated like a
claim under a void tax deed. Here you are trying to wipe out
my client's equity of redemption by a quiet title suit and I
don't think you can do it. Our Court of Appeals in Venner
vs. Denver Union Water Co., 15 Appeals 495, refused to
permit grantees of purchasers at a void foreclosure to maintain a suit to remove a cloud on title. In Stephens vs. Clay
the purchaser at an irregular trustee's sale sought by quiet
title suit to wipe out the interest of the owner of an undivided
one-half interest in the premises. The Court refused the relief and suggested that the plaintiff should seek relief by judicial foreclosure and sale, or by other appropriate action. If
anything, we have the right to bring an action to quiet the
title against you under the doctrine of the Carlson vs. Howe
case, and that is what we intend to do.
"You might look at the cases of Miller vs. Denver, 63
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Colo. 385, and Ruedy vs. Alamosa Bank, 77 Colo. 112, and
an annotation in 73 A. L. R. at page 612, which deal with
defective foreclosures through Court if you want some ideas
on the subject.
"Of course we might sue to set the sale aside under the
authority of the cases of Brewer vs. Harrison, 27 Colo. 349,
and Lathrop vs. Tracy, 24 Colo. 382," concluded Tainer.
After this barrage of these and other authorities which
both lawyers pretended to know and which they wanted to
read, the conference adjourned to meet the following day.
It is sufficient to say at this late hour that our friend
Tainer's arguments won out. A settlement was reached and
as we drop our curtain we find Gage and Dunn going down
the elevator together, conversing as follows:
"Dunn, I have to admit you have a good lawyer. How
do you pay him?"
"I don't, Gage, you do every time we settle. What I
can't understand is why you hire Wise."
"Well, to tell you the truth, Dunn," replied Gage, "he
is my son-in-law."
So this fable ends with the moral"One of the ways to acquire a law practice is to
marry it."

WILL IT COME TO THIS?
Count that day lost whose slow-descending sun finds
no lawyer sued for some lawsuit not won.

LOST-VOL. 61, CORPUS JURIS
Finder notify Judge Sackmann.
Can be identified by sticker "Melville" on backbone.

